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An	institutional	mismatch:	Why	‘taking	back	control’
proved	so	appealing	in	the	Brexit	debate
‘Taking	back	control’	was	a	key	element	of	the	Leave	campaign’s	case	for	Brexit,	but	why	did	the
principle	find	such	resonance	among	the	British	public?	Drawing	on	a	new	study,	Susanne	K
Schmidt	writes	that	it	is	important	to	recognise	some	core	features	of	the	UK	polity	that	contrast	with
the	EU’s	political	system.	These	institutional	differences	formed	the	foundations	for	Britain’s	decision
to	leave.
The	political	process	leading	to	the	Leave	vote	in	the	UK’s	EU	referendum	was	fraught	with	contingencies.	If	David
Cameron	had	not	promised	a	referendum,	if	the	tabloids	had	not	been	so	nationalistic,	or	if	austerity	measures	had
not	hit	social	spending	to	the	extent	they	did,	the	picture	today	could	be	very	different.	Many	analyses	have	focused
on	political	preference	formation	and	the	politicisation	of	EU	membership	against	an	English	lack	of	European
identity.	Others	have	focused	on	the	economic	underpinnings	of	the	vote.	Surprisingly,	however,	scant	attention	has
been	paid	to	the	institutional	foundations	of	Brexit.
A	case	of	institutional	mismatch
Vis-à-vis	other	EU	member	states,	the	UK	is	unique	with	its	strong	majoritarian	traits.	As	a	common	law	country
with	a	tradition	of	parliamentary	sovereignty,	there	is	a	significant	mismatch	between	the	UK’s	institutional	features
and	the	prevailing	mode	of	policymaking	in	the	European	Union.	Integration	in	the	EU	is	very	much	‘integration
through	law’	with	rulings	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ)	giving	important	impulses.
Once	the	ECJ	declared	the	Treaty’s	direct	effect	and	supremacy	in	the	1960s,	case	law	interpreting	its	rules	as
quasi-constitutional	requirements	was	able	to	push	integration	beyond	what	legislative	majorities	could	have
achieved.	Dieter	Grimm	has	coined	the	term	‘over-constitutionalisation’	to	characterise	the	resulting	limits	for
majoritarian	decision-making.	It	comes	as	no	surprise	that	the	way	the	ECJ	can	shape	policymaking	in	the	EU
stands	in	stark	contrast	to	the	UK’s	pronounced	majoritarian	traits.
This	is	particularly	true	if	we	consider	another	feature	of	the	UK	polity:	it	is	a	common	law	country,	implying	that
legal	principles	set	by	judgments	are	treated	as	law.	The	UK	administration	is	well	versed	in	implementing	case	law
directly.	While	its	majoritarian	tradition	lets	the	UK	be	particularly	sensitive	to	the	loss	of	sovereignty	rooted	in	over-
constitutionalisation,	the	common	law	tradition	means	that	these	constraints	will	likely	be	implemented	with	explicit
reference	to	the	ECJ!
The	importance	of	intra-EU	migration…
In	the	Brexit	process,	the	extent	of	intra-EU	migration	to	the	UK	was	a	major	concern.	Given	the	high	salience	of
this	issue,	it	is	revealing	how	strongly	ECJ	case	law	structures	the	rights	of	EU	citizens	working	and	living	in	other
member	states.	The	right	to	freedom	of	movement	of	workers	was	already	included	in	the	Treaty	of	Rome,	including
‘the	abolition	of	any	discrimination	based	on	nationality	between	workers	of	the	Member	States	as	regards
employment,	remuneration	and	other	conditions	of	work	and	employment’	(Article	48	(2)	now	Article	45	TFEU,
Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union).	Expecting	that	other	member	states	would	immediately	grant
free	movement	rights	after	the	2004	eastern	enlargement,	the	UK	renounced	the	possibility	of	a	transition	period.
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The	non-British	resident	population	grew	from	5%	in	2004	to	8.4%	in	2014,	and	migration	from	Poland	during	that
time	has	been	described	as	possibly	the	largest	movement	between	two	countries	in	peace	times.	The	extent	of
migration	was	not	only	substantial;	it	also	has	to	be	seen	in	the	context	of	several	institutional	characteristics	of	the
UK.
To	begin	with,	inhabitants	in	the	UK	are	not	obliged	to	register	with	the	authorities.	Official	data	on	migration
therefore	works	with	estimates.	The	British	welfare	state	relies	in	part	on	non-contributory	provisions.	In-work
benefits	complement	a	flexible	labour	market,	giving	incentives	for	taking	up	work,	even	if	it	is	low-paid.	Labour
regulations	are	hardly	enforced.	This	combination	leads	to	a	propensity	to	attract	lower	skilled	migration,	causing
workers	with	lower	wages	to	come	under	pressure	while	higher	wages	profit	from	additional	labour	supply.	Although
analyses	have	shown	benefits	overall	from	intra-EU	migration,	these	benefits	were	not	equally	distributed.
…and	judicialised	rights	to	equal	treatment
For	our	context,	it	is	important	to	understand	how	crucial	ECJ	case	law	was	for	shaping	the	free-movement	regime,
and	to	elucidate	the	constitutional	requirements	following	directly	from	the	Treaty	as	well	as	the	conditions	resulting
from	secondary	law.	After	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht	took	a	further	step	by	introducing	EU	citizenship	rights	in	Article
18	TEC,	the	Court	embarked	on	a	journey	that	appeared	to	promise	equal	rights	to	EU	citizens	regardless	of	their
financial	means.	It	continued	doing	so	even	after	the	Citizenship	Directive	of	2004	made	clear	that	member	states
were	keen	to	uphold	differences	in	entitlements	between	economically	active	and	inactive	EU	citizens.	Only	in
autumn	2014,	with	the	case	of	Dano	(C-333/13),	did	the	Court	start	to	take	the	restrictions	on	equal	treatment
introduced	by	the	directive	seriously.
Because	a	non-contributory,	tax-financed	welfare	system	is	very	open	to	claims	by	migrants,	particularly	as	there	is
no	registration	requirement,	the	UK	had	introduced	a	habitual	residence	test	as	early	as	1994.	Previously,	income
support	had	been	granted	irrespective	of	length	of	residence	in	the	UK.	For	the	definition	and	determination	of
habitual	residence,	the	UK	government	uses	criteria	established	by	the	ECJ	in	its	case	law,	reflecting	the	common
law	tradition.
At	the	time	of	the	eastern	enlargement	in	2004,	the	government	introduced	a	right-to-reside	test	to	ensure	that	EU
citizens	settling	in	the	UK	are	either	self-sufficient	or	economically	active.	As	UK	nationals	do	not	need	to	pass	the
test,	it	discriminates	against	EU	citizens.	The	European	Commission	started	an	infringement	procedure	in	2010	that
was	handed	to	the	ECJ	in	2013.	Just	days	before	the	June	2016	referendum,	the	ECJ	ruled	in	favour	of	the	UK	(C-
308/14).
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The	common	law	tradition	allowed	judicial	principles	to	directly	inform	administrative	practices,	leaving	the	reference
to	the	ECJ‘s	interpretations	intact.	Thus,	a	revised	habitual-residence	test	with	more	individualised	questions,
including	queries	regarding	efforts	to	get	into	work,	mirrored	the	ECJ’s	requirement	for	individual	assessments	in	its
ruling	in	Brey	(C-140/12).	The	Genuine	Prospect	of	Work	test	introduced	in	mid-2014	follows	the	case	Antonissen
(C-292/89),	whereby	the	eligibility	of	EU	citizens	for	jobseekers’	allowance	is	linked	to	their	‘genuine	chances	of
being	engaged’	(No.	21).	ECJ	criteria	for	the	status	of	‘worker’	were	also	taken	up:	employment	needs	to	be
‘genuine	and	effective’	and	not	only	‘marginal	and	ancillary’	(case	53/81	Levin).
The	institutional	roots	of	‘taking	back	control’
Intra-EU	migration	was	the	single	most	important	political	issue	leading	to	the	politicisation	of	EU	membership,
resulting	in	the	vote	for	Leave.	Once	the	decision	against	a	transition	period	was	taken,	Britain’s	flexible	labour
market	and	wage	differentials	motivated	significant	and	unexpected	migration	from	the	new	eastern	member	states.
That	the	slogan	‘take	back	control’	could	find	such	resonance	is	rooted	in	the	institutional	mismatch	between	an	EU
that	has	constitutionalised	and	judicialised	many	policy	choices,	and	the	UK	common	law	tradition	that	made	the
stark	contrast	with	legitimacy	rooted	in	parliamentary	sovereignty	so	evident.	But	Brexit	also	shows	how
constitutionalising	policy	choices,	and	accepting	case	law	rather	than	political	preferences	to	shape	policy
decisions,	carries	a	danger	of	shifting	political	contestation	to	another	level.
For	more	information,	see	the	author’s	accompanying	article	in	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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